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Professional Ethics of Chinese
Judges
A rising issue in the landscape of judicial practice
Yuwen Li
1 On October 18th 2001, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court issued the Code of Conduct
for Judges in the PRC (the Code) 1, which makes China one of the few countries in the
world with a specific code of conduct for the judiciary. Following the amendment of the
Law on Judges in June 2001, the introduction of the Code was an important event, and
one  that  illustrated  the  continued  efforts  of  the  Supreme  People’s  Court  (SPC)  to
improve professionalism among judges.
2 The promulgation  of  the  Code  can be  looked at  from two angles.  Inwardly,  it  is  a
natural development in court reforms that began more than a decade ago. In the 1980s
court reform started with a change in the trial mechanism of local courts to overcome
the inability of the courts to handle the increased number of civil and economic cases
resulting from the economic reforms2. Since then the SPC has taken the leading role in
furthering and widening the reforms, to cover trial proceedings, the enforcement of
judgments, the reorganisation of the internal bodies of the court, the management of
judges, etc. These changes relate to the trial system, institutional reorganisation, and
the granting of more autonomy to judges. It is becoming obvious that reform measures
cannot be efficiently implemented without an improvement in the professional quality
of  judges.  Judicial  professionalism  demands  both  the  competence  of  judges  to
adjudicate cases according to law and to a high standard of morality and conduct to
ensure that judges are (and are seen to be) fair and impartial.
3 Outwardly, the emphasis on judicial ethics is a positive response to public opinion. In
recent years, although the Chinese courts are handling more and more cases and their
role in society is now more prominent, dissatisfaction with and complaints about the
work of the courts has also increased considerably. The delay in the handling of cases,
the  lack  of  transparency  of  judicial  proceedings,  widespread  judicial  misconduct,
judicial corruption, and the slow, disorganised and inefficient reform measures have all
generated  mounting  discontent.  Some  Chinese  commentators  have  concluded  that
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there is widespread distrust of the judiciary by the public as a whole.3 Their critique has
pointed out that judicial power (as a public power) in China is now being privatised,
personalised and localised. 
4 The  term  “ethics”  usually  refers  to  a  collection  of  rules  or  standards  of  conduct
expected of  a  particular professional  group,  such as doctors,  solicitors or judges.  It
requires that any member of such a group who departs from those ethical standards to
a striking degree will be excluded from his profession. It has been argued, “the ethical
standards  required  from  judges  call  for  perhaps  the  highest  and  most  rigorous
standards, sacrifices and disciplines of any profession in the community”4.
5 There are different ways of dealing with the issue of judicial ethics. Some countries
address  the  issue  in  general  law.  For  instance,  Germany  has  a  judiciary  act  which
contains certain articles dealing with judges’ conduct, but no detailed standards5. On
the other hand, some countries have a special code of conduct for judges, such as the
USA, Canada and Italy6. 
6 In China,  the Law on Judges,  the Organic  Law of  the Courts,  and the Criminal  Law
contain provisions relevant to judicial ethics. The promulgation of the Code could be
evaluated as a further step in the standardising of judges’ conduct. The Code contains
50  articles,  divided  under  the  headings  of  six  essential  principles,  namely:  judicial
impartiality,  judicial  efficiency,  integrity  of  judges,  judicial  decorum,  the  self-
improvement of judges and the restriction of extra-judicial activities.  These general
principles are similar to those provided in the US Code7; however, the detailed rules
under each principle reflect Chinese characteristics. This article will first analyse the
principles and standards of the Code by providing some general information on the
current problems facing the Chinese judiciary. It will then discuss various aspects and
obstacles to the implementation of the Code. Most information given in this article is
based on an overview of Chinese and English legal literature, and, to certain extent, on
the author’s interviews with Chinese judges, scholars and lawyers.
Principle 1: ensuring judicial impartiality
7 Seventeen of  the 50 articles of  the Code are devoted to judicial  impartiality,  which
covers  four  aspects:  substantive  justice  and  procedural  justice;  independence;
neutrality; and non-discrimination.
Substantive justice and procedural justice
8 Article 1 of the Code requires that, when exercising adjudicative power, judges should
aim for both substantive and procedural justice and such justice should be shown by a
judge’s conduct in and outside the courtroom to avoid any reasonable public doubts
about judicial impartiality.
9 Chinese legal tradition emphasised substantive justice while it  neglected procedural
justice.  Even  though,  since  the  1980s,  laws  on  criminal,  civil  and  administrative
procedure have established and strengthened the procedural system, they “still exhibit
features  of  Maoist-socialist  law—flexibility,  inexactness, and  preoccupation  with
substantive justice”8.  In practice some procedural rules are not strictly followed and
some are even seriously violated by some courts9.  Violations of procedural rules are
mainly reflected in four aspects as described by a Chinese scholar10. First, obvious abuse
of procedural laws in handling cases, such as fighting for jurisdiction of a case while
ignoring provisions of jurisdiction; refusing to file a case under the court’s jurisdiction
or unduly delaying making the decision as to whether a case can be filed; breach of
rules on collection of evidence by meeting one party and his lawyer, or even travelling,
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dining, and staying at the same hotel with the party (san tong, in which the costs are
paid by the party); breach of the principle that the courts, the prosecution office and
the  public  security  organs  should  divide  responsibility  and  inspect  each  other,  by
exercising  a  system  of  “jointly  handled  cases”  (lianhe  ban’an);  violation  of  the
supervision  provision  between  higher  and  lower  courts  by  “communication  in
advance”; violation of mediation rules by forcing parties to accept mediation; breach of
the open trial system; and willingly delaying the handling of cases, causing a violation
of the time limit for conclusion of the trial of a case. Secondly, not strictly following
legal procedure. For instance, having made a decision on a case before the case comes
to trial, making the trial a mere formality; people’s assessors merely accompanying the
judge, but not being involving substantively in handling a case, rendering the collegiate
system a  ceremony;  not  giving  sufficient  time for  the  parties  and their  lawyers  to
prepare  their  defence;  and  not  providing  legal  reasoning  in  judgments.  Thirdly,
improperly modified legal procedure, for example, the chief of the department and the
president  of  a  court  approving  judgment  unilaterally  thus  undermining  the
competence of the collegiate bench provided by law; and, for difficult cases the lower
court  applying  instructions  from  a  higher  court  violating  the  jurisdiction  system
provided by law. Fourthly, various procedural rights enjoyed by parties to a case are
sometimes not respected or parties are deprived of these rights. Such rights include
having a lawyer and agent; a request for an open trial and a published judgment; a
request for reasonable time to prepare a defence; requiring judges who have a personal
interest  in  a  case  to  withdraw;  a  request  for  mediation  and  a  voluntarily  reached
mediation agreement; and requiring judges to pay cautious attention to one’s opinions
during a trial. 
10 It is small wonder then, that a saying in goes China that procedural rules are hard law
for the parties but soft law for the courts and judges11. 
11 It should be noted that the most serious violations of procedural rules occur in the pre-
trial phase during detention. It is not exceptional that suspects have no timely access to
a defence lawyer and that lawyers meet obstacles in the gathering and investigation of
evidence12.  Police  intimidation  and  brutality  are  also  not  unusual.  A  distinguished
Chinese legal expert, He Weifang, points out that from Chinese media reports we know
that occasionally suspects are tortured, and we also know that often the cases exposed
by  the  media  are  particularly  serious,  where  death  has  resulted, such  as  the  case
reported by the Southern Weekend on April 24th 1998 under the title ‘A Death Case
from the Public Security Office’13. It is in fact not difficult to find information in Chinese
newspapers and legal journals on the torture or illegal treatment of suspects and even
non-suspects  by  the  police.  For  instance,  in  December  2001  the  journal  “Fazhi  yu
xinwen” (Law and News) reported a case where policemen tortured two murder suspects
and forced them to write affidavits causing a six-year long and unjust case against the
suspects, following which one suspect received three death penalties. Fortunately, he
escaped execution following retrial14. In another case, a policeman spent hours alone
with a 17-year old country girl in a police station to persuade her to confess to having
had sexual relationships, which led the girl to commit suicide15. According to an official
statistic,  there were 19,504 cases of human rights violations by police from 1991 to
1993,  approximately 7,000 annually16.  Instances of judges beating up defendants are
also reported. For instance, two judges in a county court in Hubei province, in carrying
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out a summons for detention, had a quarrel with the defendant; the judges beat the
defendant leaving him with serious injuries17. 
12 In recent  years,  Chinese lawyers  have been active supporters  of  procedural  justice,
advocating  that,  when  serious  procedural  errors  are  found  to  have  occurred,  the
release of a suspect is less harmful to society than an open violation of procedural law.
This is because the recognition of a violation of a person’s procedural rights amounts to
the recognition of an illegal act by the judicial organs. If the judicial organs do not take
procedural  law  seriously,  they  may  infringe  citizens’  rights  at  will,  which  causes
extensive damage to society. Moreover, violation of procedure is in essence a violation
of human rights: “Someone who is involved in the violation of human rights and in
illegal acts has an ulterior motive and thus is guilty of using state power for private
interests”18.  Such  views  need  to  acquire  sufficient  attention  and  support  from  the
Chinese judiciary. In addition, one has to regret that the lack of effective provisions in
Chinese  law  on  the  legal  consequences  of  the  violation  of  procedural  rules,  which
results in violations not being able to be dealt with promptly19. Jing Hanchao, Deputy
President of  the Higher Court in Hebei province,  once pointed out that despite the
prohibition by law, torture cannot be prevented in practice mainly because evidence
obtained under torture is still being used by judicial organs. If any evidence obtained by
torture were absolutely excluded by the courts,  then the torture problem would be
resolved20.
Independence
13 Judicial independence, as the precondition for judicial impartiality, is a fundamental
principle  codified  by  law  in  most  countries  and  is  recognised  by  international
conventions. According to international standards, judicial independence includes both
the  independence  of  courts  and  the  independence  of  judges21.  Under  the  current
Chinese legal framework, only the independence of courts is recognised, though one
could  argue  strongly  that,  in  practice,  such  independence  is  hampered  by  various
borders. The independence of judges as a body as well as individuals remains unclear in
law. 
14 There are a number of articles in English dealing with the troublesome issue of judicial
independence in China22. One could argue that many judicial problems and crises derive
from the lack of such independence. It is a fundamental fault in the Chinese system and
can only be resolved with determined political will. Indeed, in recent years the Chinese
government has gradually loosened its control on the economic sector so as to allow
the transition to a market economy. The success of the Chinese economy over the last
twenty years has proved the corrective effect of this policy. Similarly, promotion of an
independent judiciary could in the long run well facilitate China’s economic prosperity,
social stability and progress, as well as political democracy. All these factors will in the
end strengthen the authority and public trust of the government. 
15 Currently,  interference  with  judicial  work  mainly  comes  from  two  sources.  Firstly,
Party  and  government  intervention,  such  as  Party  and  government  officials  giving
instructions to judges in an individual case; political and legal committees (organs of
the Party at  all  levels)  discussing significant cases;  and the police,  the prosecutor’s
office and the court sometimes deciding cases jointly. Even though there is no legal
basis for such practices, they exist as the government’s habitual way of treating the
courts.  The  second  source  of  intervention  in  judicial  processes  is  individual
intervention, which may come from those who possess administrative power or those
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who  have  money.  Since  Chinese  courts,  especially  local  courts,  depend  on  local
government for financial support and the appointment and promotion of judges, they
are particularly weak in facing up to government interference. This has resulted in a
dramatic  increase  in  local  judicial  protectionism.  The  Supreme  People’s  Court
recognised  that  “the  emergence  and  extension  of  local  judicial  protectionism  has
seriously threatened the integrity and authority of our country’s socialist legal system”
23.  One  Chinese  commentator  has  summarised  local  judicial  protectionism  into  six
facets24:
16 1) Some courts compete for jurisdiction by handling cases they should not handle in
order to get the advantage in cases involving property or profit;
17 2) some courts refuse to file cases or postpone the hearing of cases so as to assist local
parties;
18 3) some courts wilfully treat economic crimes as economic disputes so as to protect a
local party’s illegal gains;
19 4) some courts inappropriately apply coercive measures so as to be the first to control
assets;
20 5) some courts misinterpret the law, distort the facts, and make unfair judgments in
favour of the local party;
21 6) some courts make it difficult for non-local judgments to be enforced.
22 Despite  the  serious  difficulties  and  obstacles  to  judicial  independence,  the  Code  of
Conduct for Chinese Judges cannot avoid the issue because of its crucial nature for the
judiciary. The Code intends to remind judges to uphold the principle of independence
in adjudication by stressing that: they are not subject to interference by administrative
organs,  social  organs or individuals (Art.  2);  they should refuse parties,  or anybody
using “networking” in an attempt to influence them (Art. 4); and they should think
independently,  judging  autonomously  and  have  the  courage  to  reach  the  decision
which  they  believe  to  be  correct  (Art.  7).  However,  in  view  of  these  types  of
interference,  which  are  deeply  rooted  in  the  legal  and  political  systems,  one  can
imagine how it must be for judges to follow the Code’s provisions closely. Recently, the
Chinese newspaper “Southern Weekend” reported that a judge, Jia Tingrun, who was
the  President  of  Lulong County  Court  in  Hebei  Province,  suffered unfair  treatment
because he refused to try a case according to the local government’s instruction. In
March 1994, he had to deal with a “tough case” concerning a manager of a private
business  who  was  accused  of  “embezzlement  and  misappropriation  of  co-operative
funds” by the local government. Judge Jia discovered that the manager was merely a
farmer and therefore, under the law, could not be charged with such a crime. His view
was rejected by the local government. The Qinhuangdao Municipal Intermediate Court
(which is a level higher than the county court) instructed Judge Jia just to follow the
local  government’s  instruction.  The  local  Communist  Party  officials  also  pressured
Judge Jia to resolve the case soon. However, Judge Jia did not submit to these pressures.
In  August  1994,  the  local  government  announced the  decision by  the  Qinhuangdao
Party Committee to remove Judge Jia from the office of President of the County Court.
A few days later he was dismissed from the Court and was transferred to the county
judicial bureau as an ordinary cadre. His salary was cut from 620 yuan to 350 yuan and
his administrative ranking was moved down two levels. Moreover, the Qinhuangdao
Party  Committee  and  the  Lulong  County  Party  Committee  organised  several
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investigation  groups  to  look  for  financial  problems  concerning  Judge  Jia,  but  they
revealed nothing. After the removal of Judge Jia, the manager was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment as the local government had wanted. This wrongful judgment was
only corrected in 2001 after years of effort on the part of a few lawyers. Consequently,
Judge Jia’s bitter experience became known25. This case shows the vulnerability of the
judge and president of a local court in facing the powerful governmental and Party
influence.
23 Aside  from  external  interference  with  the  courts’  and  judges’  independence,  the
independence  of  individual  judges  within  Chinese  courts  is  also  jeopardised  by
colleagues trying to influence one another. To correct this practice, Article 13 of the
Code requires a judge to respect the exercise of independence in adjudication by other
judges.  More precisely,  a  judge may not comment on cases being handled by other
judges and may not give suggestions or opinions on cases in which his interests are
involved; he may not ask about or interfere in cases that are being handled by lower
courts; and he may not offer personal opinions to the higher court for cases at second
instance. Article 14 requires further that a judge, except in exercising his adjudication
or management duty, may not ask for information about cases handled by other judges.
A judge may not reveal or provide information to the parties or their representatives
concerning the hearing of the case and ways to contact the judges in charge, nor may
he  introduce  the  judges  to  the  parties  concerned.  These  standards  on  judges’
relationships within a court seem attainable if courts and judges take them seriously. 
24 In  addition,  the  Code  specifically  requires  that  judges  should  not  be  improperly
influenced by the media and public opinion and should not give comments in public or
to  the  media,  which  might  undermine  the  seriousness  and  authority  of  a  valid
judgment (Art.  16).  In recent years a positive development in China has been more
media coverage of court work, in particular discussions of effective judgments. Both
national and local TV stations broadcast regular programmes revealing how the law is
working  in  the  courts.  The  media  try  to  invite  more  judges  to  comment  on
controversial cases and public ratings for such programmes are high. This development
enhances people’s legal education and is conducive to the promotion of the public’s
right to information. But,  inconsistent opinions of individual judges may also cause
people to doubt the integrity and fairness of the judiciary as a whole, and a judge may
also be under pressure to make a certain judgment. The Code intends to find a balance
between the independence of the judge and the authority of the judiciary as a whole. It
is internationally recognised that:
 “Sustaining support for judicial independence in this age of political and media
scrutiny is a weighty challenge… central to meeting that challenge is a judiciary
that recognises the importance of communicating with the public in ways that will
enhance their legitimacy and justify their independence”26.
25 As far as the relationship between judges and the media is concerned, Chinese judges
face the same dilemma as judges in other countries;  moreover, they suffer from an
extreme lack of experience in dealing with the media. It seems advisable that some
concrete measures need to be introduced to reduce the risk involved where individual
judges deal with the media. For instance, each court could have one or two press judges
who are responsible for all of the court’s contact with the media, including newspapers,
radio, TV, etc.
Neutrality
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26 Article 11 of the Code obliges judges to remain neutral in their handling of cases. It
requires that before a judgment is announced, a judge should not reveal his opinion or
attitude  by  language,  expression  or  conduct  and  a  judge  should  mediate  cases  in
accordance  with  law  and  be  cautious  with  language  and  conduct  so  as  to  avoid
generating any reasonable doubt as to his impartiality. Article 5 stresses that judges
should  not  take  improper  measures  to  force  parties  to  withdraw  a  case  or  accept
mediation against their will. Article 8 states that during the process of a lawsuit judges
should not meet a party or his representative privately. There are at least two main
problems relating to the neutrality of judges. One concerns mediation, and the other
relates to ex parte contact.
27 As to mediation, it has played a significant role in the history of the communist judicial
system, which resulted in the realisation of mediation as the core model of handling
civil and economic cases while adjudication was neglected. Since the end of the 1970s
mediation has undergone some changes27. The 1982 Civil Procedure Law (CPL) amended
the policy of “mediation as core” into the principle of “emphasising mediation”. The
1991  revised  CPL  further  weakened  it  to  “carrying  out  lawful  mediation  based  on
voluntarism and law”. However, under the current civil, criminal and administrative
procedure laws mediation is still regarded as a significant step before adjudication28.
According to critics29 Chinese judges habitually prefer recourse to mediation, and this
was not only because of the law and policy influence in the past but also due to their
own  interests.  Compared  to  adjudication,  mediation  could  bring  judges  some
advantages:  it  enables  judges  to  handle  more  cases  at  the  same  time;  generally
speaking, mediation is a speedy way of ending a case; and it is rather flexible in process.
As  to  writing  a  legal  document,  some  cases  do  not  require  a  formal  mediation
agreement. Furthermore, for those cases where a mediation agreement is needed, such
an  agreement  need  only  contain  the  litigation  claims,  facts  and  mediation  results,
unlike a judgment which has to provide detailed arguments on the recognition of facts
and the application of laws. Since many courts exercise a system of evaluating a judge’s
work according to the number of cases the judge has handled, and linking this directly
with  the  economic  value  of  a  judge,  this  inevitably  encourages  judges  to  choose
mediation as  a  fast-result  model  to  deal  with cases.  In  addition,  mediation enables
judges to  avoid making difficult  decisions.  In  practice  under certain circumstances,
such as insufficient evidence to reach a certain decision, lack of clear legal provision, or
the  law  being  too  vague  and  general,  it  may  be  very  difficult  for  judges  to  make
judgments.  This contrasts with mediation agreements where,  so long as the parties
concerned reach a compromise, there is no need to state which legal provisions form
the basis of the agreement. Furthermore, there is little risk to judges in mediation since
no appeal or retrial procedure is possible. If a judgment is changed by the higher court
on appeal,  the original judgment is deemed wrong and subsequently the judge who
made the judgment is considered to have made a wrong decision.
28 Taking  into  account  all  these  benefits,  one  can  understand  why  judges  prefer
mediation. However, such a preference also results in serious problems of coercion and
non-voluntary  mediation,  and  mediation  without  principles30.  Moreover,  some
increasingly  grave  judicial  problems,  such  as  judicial  corruption,  abuse  of  judicial
power  and  local  judicial  protectionism,  are  to  various  degrees  linked  with  the
mediation system31. It is observed that: “A variety of sources suggest that in practice
judicial mediation raises serious issues of legality”32.
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29 To minimise these problems, Chinese judges need to change their attitude and habitual
approach to mediation. Moreover, further improvement of the law and reform of the
trial  system are also essential.  If  mediation fails,  a  judge involved in the mediation
should not be the judge to try the case.
30 With regard to ex parte contact, according to an authoritative source, ex parte contact is
rather common in China’s judicial  practice33.  In 1998, the Judicial  Committee of the
Supreme People’s Court issued the Several Provisions Relating to the Reform of Civil
and  Economic  Trials.  Article 6  of  the  Provisions  provides  that,  “members  of  the
collegiate  bench  and  single  judges  should  not,  before  trial,  meet  one  party  or  his
representatives  privately.”  This  was  the  first  time  that  ex  parte contact  had  been
officially prohibited34. Article 32 of the 2001 amended Law on Judges prohibits judges
meeting parties or their representatives privately, attending dinners or accepting gifts
given by parties or their representatives. 
31 Ex parte contact is a principal channel for judicial corruption, often taking place in a
judge’s office or home, restaurant, hotel, bar or other place of entertainment35. A party
or his lawyer uses such opportunities not only to try to influence the judge’s opinion on
a case but also to give the judge gifts or bribe him. The problem of ex parte contact is
two-sided. On the one hand it is closely linked with the general environment in China
that  too  often  if  one  wants  something  to  be  done  one  has  to  use  “personal
relationships”. People feel more secure if they have access to a judge outside the court.
This phenomenon itself is a repercussion of the lack of the rule of law. On the other
hand some judges, for various reasons, accept the invitations of parties to lawsuits.
Over the years this “give and take” practice has developed into a vicious circle that
once a lawsuit has emerged, all parties try to establish contact with the judges. Winning
a case becomes a matter of who has strong relations with the judges or courts (da guansi
shi da guanxi).
32 To resolve or diminish the problem of ex parte contact, judges should strictly obey laws
and  professional  rules.  In  2000,  the  Supreme  People’s  Court  issued  the  Several
Provisions Concerning the Strict Application of the Withdrawal System by Judges36. It
provides that parties and their representatives, based on relevant evidence, have the
right  to  ask  judges  to  withdraw  if  the  judges  commit  ex  parte contact.  With  the
introduction of the new rule, some judges are finding more hidden ways to engage in ex
parte contact, which may make it difficult for a party to prove the existence of such
contact. 
Non-discrimination
33 Article 10 of the Code requires that judges treat parties and other participants in the
litigation  equally,  should  not  show  any  discrimination  in  language  and  in  deed.
Furthermore, a judge has the duty to stop and correct participants in litigation should
they use any discriminatory language or act in a discriminatory fashion. In addition,
the Code explains that a judge should be fully aware of the possible differences between
the parties due to their race, ethical beliefs, sex, profession, religious beliefs, education,
health and place of residence. Judges must ensure that all parties can exercise equally
and fully their procedural as well as substantive rights. 
34 In practice, discrimination is mainly reflected in local judicial protectionism (LJP) as
discussed earlier. It is a weak point of the Code that it does not refer to LJP directly,
which perhaps is due to the complicated nature of LJP, being entangled as it is with
political as well as economic issues. 
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Principle 2: enhancement of judicial efficiency 
35 Impartiality and efficiency have been targeted as the two pillars of the courts’ work in
the  new  millennium.  With  respect  to  judicial  inefficiency,  the  most  apparent
manifestation  is  the  delay  in  the  delivery  of  judgments.  Some  commercial  cases
continue  for  years  without  court  decisions  and,  when  the  decisions  are  made,  the
parties involved in the cases may have gone bankrupt, or illegally transferred their
property, which makes enforcement impossible. Some Chinese people have stated that
they do have the money to bring a lawsuit to a court, but do not have the time to wait
for delayed proceedings (dadeqi guansi, dan dengbuqi). Thus, it is a trend for companies
to settle disputes outside court for reasons of efficiency. For individual citizens, the
tragedy that can be caused by a court’s inefficiency can also be alarming. In a case of no
great complexity concerning state compensation, a female farmer was pushed from one
court to another. The case ran for four years and during this period she received seven
different court rulings37. In another small debt dispute case, proceedings lasted seven
years and the various courts involved rendered eight judgments38.
36 In  responding  to  the  most  common  problems  in  China,  the  Code  addresses  the
efficiency issue from four perspectives. It first requires that judges should not delay in
handling cases because of their schedules for private matters (Art. 18). Secondly, judges
should follow strictly the time limit provided by law to promptly register, hear a case,
and deliver judgment (Art. 19).  Thirdly, judges should pay reasonable and sufficient
time to all cases assigned to them. They should pay enough attention to save time for
the parties, attorney and defendants and should work efficiently with other judges and
judicial officers (Art. 20). Finally, judges should supervise parties to a case to ensure
that they follow litigation procedure and time requirements (Art. 21). 
37 The main reasons for the lack of efficiency are twofold39. Firstly, many of the delays and
difficulties are due to weak conceptions of time, and the incompetent and bureaucratic
way of handling cases still used by Chinese judges. It is no exaggeration to state that
efficiency is a somewhat new concept for most Chinese judges. Secondly, some systems
provided  in  Chinese  law  result  in  inefficiency.  The  retrial  system  provides  a  good
example. According to Art. 177 of the Civil Procedure Law, if the president of a court
finds some definite error in a legally effective judgment or order of his court and deems
it necessary to have the case retried, he should refer it to the judicial committee for
decision. On the same ground, the Supreme People’s Court has the power to bring a
case for trial by itself or direct a lower court to hear a retrial. Since the law does not
provide time limits for the retrial of a case, in practice, a case can be retried a number
of times.
Principle 3: keep clean and honest in performing duty 
38 This principle tackles the ethical issue from an economic angle. The Code sets up the
Five No’s:
39 1) judges should neither directly nor indirectly use their position to obtain improper
benefits for themselves, their relatives or others (Art. 23);
40 2) judges should not accept entertainment, goods, etc., offered by the parties to a case,
their representatives and defenders (Art. 24);
41 3)  judges  should  not  become  involved  in  commercial  activities  or  other  economic
activities that may cause public doubt as to the integrity of judges (Art. 25);
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42 4) judges should make appropriate arrangements for their personal affairs and should
not deliberately disclose their position as judge in order to obtain special attention, and
should not use the reputation and influence associated with the position for private
interests either for themselves, their relatives or others (Art. 26);
43 5) judges should not be part-time lawyers, legal advisors for companies, governmental
institutions or individuals and should not provide legal advice or legal opinions on a
pending case to parties (Art. 28).
44 It is true that most Chinese condemnation of judicial corruption is related to the above-
mentioned  Five  No’s.  Over  the  years,  it  has  become a  serious  problem that  judges
accept money, gifts and invitations for meals from both the plaintiff and defendant.
Some Chinese say “the judge’s big hat has two brims, after eating with the plaintiff, eat
with the defendant; after he has finished eating with them both, he says that the legal
system is not perfect”40. Even though Chinese laws, such as the Civil Procedure Law and
the  Law on Judges,  and several  orders  of  the  SPP41,  prohibit  judges  from misusing
power  for  private  gain,  in  reality  this  serious  misconduct  has  only  intensified  and
resulted in many “human feelings cases” (renqing an), “relationship cases” (guanxi an),
and “money cases” (jinqian an)42.  The President of the Supreme People’s Court once
indicated that the ethical level of Chinese judges as a whole “is not matched with the
requirement of professionalism, and it is difficult to resist money worship, hedonism, a
privileged  mentality  and  other  corrupt  thoughts”43;  some  judges  “forge  legal
documents,  use  cases  for  private  gain,  use  power  for  private  gain,  distort  laws  for
private gain, which have made a very bad impression in society”44.
45 The Code also lays down standards for the judge's family. The lifestyle of judges and
their family should be compatible with their position and income (Art. 27). A result of
China’s economic reforms is the new wealth and potential for a life of luxury. A judge’s
normal income is almost the same as that of a civil servant, which offers a good life, but
does not make them as rich as top commercial lawyers or successful entrepreneurs. It is
true that some Chinese judges are disturbed to see that some lawyers have become rich
so  quickly,  while  they  are  far  behind.  Thus,  they  look  for  ways  to  gain  economic
benefits. Some Chinese estimate that the grey (illegally gained) income, has made the
average income of Chinese judges higher than that of lawyers45.  In Chinese culture,
people  are  fond  of  comparing  status,  rank,  income,  lifestyle,  etc.,  which  generates
much  unnecessary  dissatisfaction  with  one’s  own  life.  As  a  matter  of  economic
progress, material life has improved for most Chinese in recent years: this makes it
possible for people to choose a profession more in accordance with their own personal
wishes than from the pressure to survive. As part of legal education, one should be
taught  that  if  one  chooses  the  judiciary  as  a  profession,  one  bears  high  social
responsibility and one’s  lifestyle must fit  this  profession.  Judges should realise that
even a few judges’ corrupted behaviour could cause public distrust of the judiciary as a
whole. On the other hand, it is also the responsibility of the government to ensure that
judges receive sufficient income to maintain a good lifestyle. It is reported that some
courts, especially  at  basic  level,  could not  even guarantee that  judges receive their
salary on time. Under such circumstances how could one expect judges to be clean and
honest in performing their duty?
Principle 4: observance of judicial decorum
46 In general terms, the Code calls for judges to respect all judicial etiquette, keep up a
good appearance and civilised behaviour and to guard the authority of the courts and
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the good image of judges (Art. 31). In more concrete terms, the Code requires judges to
respect the human dignity of the parties. They should earnestly and patiently listen to
the parties to a case in expressing their views and should not interrupt or stop them at
will unless for the reason of maintaining court order. In addition, judges should use
standard and civilised language and should not admonish or apply improper words to
the  parties  (Art.  32).  In  the  courtroom,  judges  should  follow  courtroom  rules  and
supervise all persons there to do the same. Judges must wear robes or a judge’s uniform
and badge, be in the courtroom on time and not leave early, nor go in and out during
court session; and must concentrate on the trial and do nothing irrelevant to the trial
(Art. 33). 
47 Judicial decorum is fundamental for the judicial profession. Some Chinese judges are
extremely short of training in this respect. For instance, it has happened that a judges
say  to  a  rich  party  to  a  case,  “you  have  so  much  money,  paying  one  million  in
compensation is no problem for you”. Sometimes before judgment is delivered, a judge
tells a party: “you will definitely lose this case”; or a judge says arbitrarily to a party:
“what you said is not correct”. In settling divorce cases involving third parties, some
judges are too flippant, for example saying to the man that “it is not a big problem if
you have a lover, but make sure that your wife does not know and make problems”.
Some judges have been seen smoking, drinking tea and using mobile phones, as well as
actually leaving the courtroom, while the trial is in progress46. Some judges abuse their
privileged position  and  power,  criticising  and  rebuking  parties,  etc.  Such  conduct
provides a people’s court equivalent to government offices in feudal China (yamen)47.
48 The  improper  use  of  words  is  not  just  a  language  puzzle;  it  reflects  the  depleted
standards  of  the  profession.  The  Code’s  provisions  on judicial  decorum remain too
general: detailed, concrete and complete standards need to be developed. Moreover,
training of judges in this aspect needs to be strengthened. A good image and authority
of the judiciary cannot be established without the civilised and professional behaviour
of judges.
Principle 5: to strengthen self-improvement
49 Compared  to  the  other  principles,  this  one  sets  up  higher  moral  and  behavioural
standards for judges.  It  outlines an ideal  judge:  holding rich social  experiences and
profound understanding of social reality; having belief in their devotion to their duty,
judging cases according to law, upright and never stooping to flattery and not seeking
private gains; having the intuitive knowledge of punishing evil and encouraging good,
enhancing  justice;  having  the  character  of  fair-mindedness,  kindness,  modesty  and
prudence; and enjoying a good personal reputation (Art. 35). In their daily lives judges
should exercise strict self-discipline, be cautious in their words and deeds, have high
moral values and be good models of social morality and family virtue (Art. 37). 
50 Article 36 states that it is a judge’s right as well as duty to have educational training, to
foster a good learning atmosphere, to study legal theory in depth, and to advance their
judicial skills in presiding over trials, judging evidence and writing judicial documents. 
51 One may think that at present Principle 5 is more a far-reaching ideal than a reality for
many Chinese  judges.  However,  setting up high standards  in  the  Code is  definitely
needed for enhancing and improving the professionalism of judges and is essential for
the deepening of judicial reform. Unlike other principles, such as independence and
neutrality,  the realisation of  which depends on many elements,  some of  which are
beyond the control of courts and judges, self-improvement standards can be reached by
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serious commitment to the judicial profession. Consequently, education in this should
be intensified. 
Principle 6: limitation of extra-judicial activities
52 This principle lays down rules on what judges should not do, what they could do but
must be cautious in doing and what they can do within the prescribed limitations.
53 First, let us consider what judges should not do. Judges must stop harmful hobbies and
conduct, which are incompatible with the public interest, public order, social public
morality and good customs and which may affect the good image of judges and their
ability to fulfil judicial functions fairly (Art. 39). Judges should not be members of cult
organisations,  commercial  organisations  or  organisations  that  may make profits  by
using a judge’s influence (Arts. 41 and 43). 
54 Secondly, there are activities which judges could do but must be cautious in pursuing.
Article 40 states that judges should be cautious in going to places of entertainment, in
making  friends  and  in  treating  and  contacting  parties  to  cases,  lawyers  and  other
people in order to prevent generating public doubt about the fairness and integrity of
judges and to prevent possible worries and embarrassment in exercising their duties.
Moreover, when publishing articles or being interviewed by the media, judges should
exercise caution, should not make inappropriate comments on specific cases or parties
to the cases and should try to avoid causing public doubt about judicial impartiality due
to such inappropriate words or deeds (Art. 45).
55 Thirdly, there are things which judges can do, but subject to certain restrictions. As a
general rule, judges who are involved in extra-judicial activities should not allow these
activities to interfere with their performance of their judicial duties. They should also
avoid creating reasonable suspicion in the public domain about the judge’s impartiality
and  integrity,  and  avoid  damaging  public  confidence  in  the  courts  (Art.  38).  In
conducting  extra-judicial  activities,  judges  should  not  disclose  or  use  unpublished
judicial  information,  commercial  secrets,  personal  secrets  or  other  unpublished
information that they have obtained during trial cases (Art. 42). Judges may participate
in academic research or other social activities that are conducive to legal development
and judicial reform. However, such activities should be based on the conditions that
they must be legal, not hinder judicial impartiality and authority and not affect judicial
work (Art. 44). 
56 It  seems  necessary  to  discuss  the  scope  of  extra-judicial  activities.  The  Code’s
provisions  specifically  mention  entering  places  of  entertainment,  making  friends,
contact with parties to a case and their lawyers, participating in academic activities,
joining cult organisations and profit-making social organisations, publishing articles
and accepting interviews with the media.  The Code also mentions in general  terms
“various extra-judicial activities” and “harmful hobbies and conduct”. Obviously, the
Code does not provide an exhaustive list of what may be “extra-judicial activities”. In
reality, the most common problems concerning a judge’s extra-judicial activities may
not be separated from a judge’s judicial activities, such as going out for dinners with
people  who are  parties  to  cases,  actively  making  friends  with  business  people  and
giving interviews to newspapers and TV on pending cases. By implementing the Code,
judges should rethink their behaviour as a judge rather than an ordinary citizen.
57 In addition, there are also some practices which are not mentioned by the Code but are
conducted  by  judges  and  may  cause  public  suspicions  of  judicial  propriety.  For
instance, based on investigation of people’s tribunals in rural China, a researcher has
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reached the conclusion that judges working at the tribunals displayed two faces. On the
one hand, they functioned as judges by settling various disputes and, on the other, they
participated in law enforcement of local governments, such as directly taking part in
the collection of bank loans48. Local judges are also sometimes called to join popular
legal  education  activities  (pufa),  develop  and  promote  family  planning  policy,  etc.
Direct  involvement  in  activities  that  belong to  governmental  institutions  by  judges
reflects the influence of legal instrumentalism, and undermines judicial independence.
Thus, such activities should also be considered extra-judicial activities and should be
limited or prohibited.
58 Since  the  imposition  of  limits  upon  extra-judicial  activities  is  a  rather  new
phenomenon for the Chinese judiciary, and since opportunities for such activities are
increasing, judges must take the issue seriously, and courts should also protect judges
from engagement in activities that belong to executive branches. 
Implementation of the Code of Conduct
59 The Code provides some general implementation rules. Article 17 states that if a judge,
based on the information he has obtained, is sure that other judges have possibly or
actually  violated  judicial  ethics,  the  result  of  which  has  been  to  affect  judicial
impartiality,  the  judge  should  report  the  matter  to  the  relevant  organs.  Article  29
requests  judges to report  their  property honestly according to law.  However,  these
reporting systems need to be concretised.
60 Most  of  the  principles  in  the  Code  are  formulated  in  a  general  manner.  It  is
indispensable that interpretation and commentaries are made by the SPC constantly in
order to give judges direct guidance. For instance, as to extra-judicial activities, Article
45  provides  that  “judges  should  be  cautious  when  publishing  articles  or  being
interviewed  by  the  media…  to  prevent  reasonable  public  doubt  as  to  judicial
impartiality due to a judge’s improper words and actions.” Could this Article prevent a
judge from publishing romantic or detective novels that are closely related to judicial
work? The Internet is becoming a widely used platform for all industries. On a web
site49, one can find Mr. Xxx, a senior judge at the Higher Court in Shanghai, an author,
Deputy Chief Editor of the Internet journal Fayuan (The Court) and a member of the
Authors’ Association in Shanghai. This judge, besides working in court, has long been
involved in writing novels. This website published his four novels: “Judges’ Thought”,
“Judges’ Anxiety”, “Judges’ Adventure” and “Judges in Danger”. It is debatable whether
a judge who is active in publishing judiciary-related literature, which is a type of extra-
judicial activity, is behaving properly under the Code. Authoritative commentary on
this can only be given by the SPC. 
61 In addition, the education and training of judges under the Code need to be intensified.
Many types of behaviour which are prohibited in the Code were, and remain, common
practice.  Since  these  types  of  behaviour  have  become  habitual  in  much  judicial
practice,  it  is  not  easy  to  correct  them.  For  instance,  it  seems  part  of  a  cultural
phenomenon for judges to accept money, goods or invitations to have dinner with the
parties or people connected with parties. In some cases, judges may not like it but are
compelled to do so by their working environment.  It  is  said that judges sometimes
invite each other to dinners intending to use such an opportunity to arrange for a judge
to meet one of the parties to a case. If a judge does not accept an invitation first time
round, he may be considered to have disrespected the inviter; if he rejects it a second
time, he will be treated as unreasonable; and if he rejects it a third time, he is deemed
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to be an outsider and will be isolated from his colleagues50.  Chinese society is often
described  as  full  of  human  feeling  and  connections.  It  is  therefore  a  tremendous
challenge for judges to keep their distance from such cultural and social phenomena
while trying to uphold their professional ethics.
62 The Code should be viewed as a professional guideline for fostering responsible judges.
Consequently,  judges  should  be  encouraged  to  follow  the  Code  conscientiously.  In
essence, ethical issues are regulated by moral standards. To improve judicial ethics in
China largely depends upon the attitudes of the judges. However, it is always the case
that  some  judges  break  rules  to  a  remarkable  degree,  for  which  disciplinary
punishment or even their exclusion from the judiciary seems inevitable. In dealing with
such cases, strict procedures need to be applied. 
63 Lastly, the implementation of the Code needs not only the co-operation of the judges
but also institutional changes that enable judges to behave as intended in the Code.
Such institutional changes cover a wide range of aspects. For instance, the system of
selection and promotion of judges needs to be redesigned. Candidates should meet not
only the formal requirements, such as holding a law degree and passing the national
judicial examination, but also other conditions, including fine personal traits, such as
being thoughtful, humane and loyal to the highest aims of the profession. It is advisable
that psychological tests should be applied to make selections from among potential
candidates.  Such  selection  mechanisms  could  help  to  ensure  that  the  door  of  the
judiciary would open only to the most highly qualified candidates.  It  would also be
worthwhile weighing up the pros and cons of the present judicial committee system,
which  allows  members  of  the  committee  to  decide  difficult  and  significant  cases
without hearing the case. This system restricts the independence of trial judges. The
Code is absolutely right to highlight the significance of independence, neutrality and
other basic principles of the judicial profession. However, true judicial independence
cannot be guaranteed without institutional support. Some Chinese scholars have been
calling for  legislative efforts  to  entitle  courts  and judges to  exercise judicial  power
independently subject to international standards51, but for the time being the political
“go ahead” for such proposals remains unlikely. 
64 IMPROVEMENT of  the ethics  of  Chinese judges is  among ongoing efforts  at  judicial
reform. Without substantial upgrading on this matter the Chinese judiciary would not
be able to strengthen its authority, which is needed for the balance of powers. A weak,
and to a certain extent distrusted, judiciary would not be able to bear the function of an
independent  administration  of  justice.  Xiao  Yang,  the  President  of  the  Supreme
People’s Court, has stated that “the overall professional quality of Chinese judges has
not  been  high”.52 Recognition  of  this  shortcoming  should  lead  to  consistent  and
effective endeavours on the part of the Supreme People’s Court and all judges.
65 Some have tried to roughly categorise Chinese judges into four groups53. The first group
includes the excellent model judges. They possess both a high professional capacity and
a strong commitment to social justice. The second group consists of popular judges.
Under all  kinds of  pressures,  they do their best to maintain the good image of the
courts; they handle most cases fairly and are cautious in judicial practice. However,
they are sometimes influenced by their social environment and have acted in a manner
incompatible with judicial ethics. This group could be considered as judges shaped by
their  environment.  Under  a  reasonable  rule  of  law  and  a  more  conducive  social
environment, they could be good judges. The third group is slack judges. For them,
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being a judge is a means of supporting their family. Their competence in handling cases
is adequate, but they lack any real consciousness of ethical issues. Prompted by private
interests and personal relationships, they could behave in ways contrary to a judge’s
intuitive  knowledge  and may even fail  to  behave  scrupulously  and honestly  in  the
performance of their duty. The fourth group is corrupt judges. They lack professional
responsibility,  are  selfish,  take  no  notice  of  judicial  ethics  and  violate  professional
disciplines and the law. Consequently, they are the main cause of the bad image of the
judiciary. 
66 We could  assume that  only  a  small  percentage  of  judges  belong to  the  last  group,
though the damage they cause to public trust in the judiciary is immense. The first
group of judges is, sadly, also small in number. Occasionally, stories about such model
judges are reported in the newspapers; indeed, these stories can be very moving ones in
the Chinese context. The majority of judges fit into the second and third groups. They
function  in  a  typical  Chinese  environment  and  their  movement  in  good  or  bad
directions depends very much upon the “broader environment”. To guide this large
group of judges, education and training in ethics is crucial. 
67 It has been observed that in the Western world “the responsibilities of the judge were
originally framed in terms of a divine paradigm. The pattern for the judge was the
judgement  exercised  by  the  gods  or  God.  Only  at  this  very  high  level  did  it  seem
possible to attain the incorruptibility, the unchangeability, and the impartiality that
human  beings  believed  that  judges  should  have”54.  China  does  not  have  such  a
tradition. In modern times, it also seems unrealistic to impose such a belief on Chinese
judges and the Chinese public. The communist ideology concerning the ideal judge has
also  become  less  and  less  convincing.  It  seems  wise  and  realistic  to  stress  the
professional responsibility of judges from an ethical point of view. Thus, one can be
certain  of  the  significance  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Chinese  Code  for  Judges.
However, as indicated earlier, the enforcement of the Code is the final goal and this is a
more troublesome matter. As the levels and frequency of public condemnation of the
misconduct of judges show an escalating trend, an improvement in judicial ethics has
to be and is an inevitable and vital component of any judicial reform.
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